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Abstract
“Convergence behavior” is the informal, spontaneous movement of people, messages, and supplies 
toward a major emergency incident area. This form of movement brings needed aid to many 
victims, but at the same time the resultant congestion makes organization and control of the rescue 
and relief efforts more difficult. Whenever a major emergency incident occurs in Kenya, typically 
a huge crowd of sightseers and personnel converge at the scene.
This report provides a review of informal convergence behavior in Kenya during major emergency 
incidents over the last 15 years (1998–2013) and some of the risks that have been associated with 
this phenomenon. It also provides some recommendations that have been successfully 
implemented in other countries, as well as in rare instances in Kenya, to control informal 
convergence behavior.
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INTRODUCTION
“Convergence behavior” is the informal, spontaneous movement of people, messages, and 
supplies toward a major emergency incident area.1 This form of movement often brings 
much needed aid to many victims, but at the same time the resulting congestion makes 
organization and control of the rescue and relief efforts more difficult. Personal convergence 
is the actual physical movement of persons on foot, by auto, or other vehicle toward a major 
emergency incident.1 These individuals could be members of official disaster response and 
management agencies or unauthorized personnel (including unofficial responders wanting to 
provide aid), all converging on the scene. Whenever a major emergency incident occurs in 
Kenya, a large gathering of curious onlookers typically follows.2 Informal convergence has 
been observed during multiple major incidents in Kenya; however, very little information on 
this phenomenon has been objectively documented.
There are seven types of informal convergers: the returnees, who were affected by the 
incident and decide to return to the scene for closure; the anxious, who are concerned they 
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may know someone in the incident and may not know the person’s status; the helpers, who 
are similar to first responders in that they go to the scene to help those requiring assistance; 
the curious, who want to find out what has happened; the exploiters, who are looking to 
make a profit from the incident; the mourners, who converge to create memorials and mourn 
the dead; and finally the supporters, who are either individuals or groups who gather to 
encourage and express gratitude to emergency workers.1,3 These are not mutually exclusive 
categories of people; rather, each category refers to the dominant motivations of a person at 
a given point in time.
BACKGROUND
Kenya has a population of over 38 million people.4 Nairobi, the capital, is the largest city in 
Kenya, with a population of more than three million. Kenya’s major emergency incidents 
profile is dominated by droughts, floods, fires, terrorism, collapsed buildings, transportation 
accidents, and disease outbreaks.5 At least four major emergency incidents have occurred in 
Kenya each year over the last 12 years.5 In a statement made by President Kibaki in 2012, 
members of the public were encouraged to avoid scenes of major emergency incidents.6 The 
president stated, “Heavy crowding in disaster scenes not only delays rescue operations but 
also places members of the public in danger of harm.” However, despite this and other pleas 
for divergence, the number and types of major emergency incidents have been increasing in 
Kenya, with most drawing large numbers of people to the scene. However, no formal 
description of these incidents has been undertaken.
METHOD
This report is a review of informal convergence behavior in Kenya using publically available 
media sources for major emergency incidents over the last 15 years. Some of the risks that 
have been associated with this phenomenon are highlighted. The authors also provide some 
recommendations that can be implemented to control informal convergence behavior during 
major emergency incidents.
Informal convergence behavior at major incidents in Kenya
On August 7, 1998, between 10:30 a.m. and 10:40 a.m. local time, suicide bombers in a 
truck laden with explosives parked outside the United States Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya’s 
capital city.7 They initially fired upon the security guard when he refused to open the gate. 
The bombers also threw a grenade at embassy guards. As the security guard radioed for 
backup, the truck detonated. Approximately 212 people were killed, and an estimated 4,000 
were wounded. A large number of eye injuries occurred because people in buildings nearby, 
who had heard the first grenade explosion and the shooting, went to their office windows 
when the main blast occurred, shattering the windows. The scene became one of immediate 
turmoil, with hundreds of people trying to flee at the same time thousands rushed in to see 
what had happened.8 Nairobi quickly became congested and chaotic, causing additional 
problems for ambulances and rescue workers.
On January 31, 2009, a petrol tanker overturned near Molo town.9 Due to slow response 
from police, hundreds of people oblivious to the risk involved gathered to collect spilled fuel 
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from the tanker to be either used or sold, when it burst into flames. In one of Kenya’s worst 
accidents of recent times, 373 people were affected; 130 were badly burned, some beyond 
recognition, and 72 people died in hospitals.
Learning from this incident, in June 2012, police responded immediately when millions of 
shillings worth of highly flammable super petrol were spilled after a government grader 
carrying out road repairs punctured a Kenya Pipeline channel in Nakuru town.10 In this 
event, law enforcement officials were able to control a surging crowd intent on collecting the 
spilling fuel. The police action prevented individuals from accessing the spill sight and 
avoided any bystander causalities.
At least eight people were killed and nine others seriously wounded on April 4, 2012 when 
massive boulders crushed houses in Mathare slum after a night of heavy rains.11 Mathare is 
one of the largest slum areas in Kenya, with housing structures for low income and 
impoverished members of the population. Most families were asleep when the boulders fell 
from an overhanging cliff, trapping many of them. The rescue operation was hampered by 
poor coordination and inadequate equipment resources at the site as police and National 
Youth Service (NYS) personnel tried to retrieve bodies. The NYS was established in 1964 to 
train Kenyan youths in tasks of national importance, including service in the armed forces, 
national reconstruction programs, and disaster response. During the emergency incident in 
Mathare, hundreds of slum youth quickly volunteered to help rescue efforts, using their bare 
hands to remove rubble despite the heavy downpour. Officers had a difficult time controlling 
convergers who milled around the scene, hindering effective response from first responders.
An explosion tore through a shopping complex in Nairobi’s business district on May 28, 
2012 at 1:15pm, wounding more than 30 people and killing one person.12 Several casualties 
were rushed by good samaritans to the hospital. An uncontrollable crowd gathered, 
hampering rescue operations.2 The crowd made it impossible for fire engines to reach the 
scene, forcing most to take an alternative route and prolonging the response time to put out 
the ensuing fire. Looters took advantage of the confusion and carted away valuables from 
the shops. The Internal Security Assistant Minister and a local member of parliament dashed 
to the scene and appealed for calm as crowds surged to catch a glimpse of what had 
happened while police attempted to establish a perimeter.13
On September 21, 2013, unidentified gunmen attacked the upscale Westgate shopping mall 
in Nairobi.14 The attack, which lasted until September 24, resulted in 72 deaths, including 
61 civilians, six Kenyan soldiers, and four attackers. Over 175 people were reportedly 
wounded in the mass shooting. Riot police officers lobbed multiple rounds of tear gas to 
disperse hundreds of curious Kenyans who gathered near the mall during the siege.15
One month after the Westgate incident, a train smashed into a bus in Nairobi, killing 11 
people and wounding 34 others.16 Immediately after the accident, hundreds of residents 
from nearby estates gathered around the scene.17 Some people went as far as to crawl under 
the train to get a view of the opposite side of the accident. Scrap metal dealers also came to 
make an unlawful living from the mangled wreckage, using a magnet to draw metallic parts 
upward from beneath the debris. Armed with mobile phones, onlookers took photos and 
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videos of the bus wreckage to post on social media. The large crowd hindered responders’ 
access to the scene, thereby compromising the response.17
DISCUSSION
This report highlights a few examples of informal convergence behavior at major emergency 
incidents in Kenya. Despite warnings from public officials including the former head of 
state, this behavior has continued to persist. Most of the emergency incident reports 
highlight how this behavior hampered rescue operations and contributed to worse outcomes, 
as was witnessed in the Molo town tanker fire in which convergence behavior directly 
increased the morbidity and mortality of the convergers.
The issue of informal convergence behavior is not unique to Kenya; it has also been 
observed over the years at major emergency incidents throughout the world. In June 2012, 
chaos broke out in a densely-populated Lagos City neighborhood in Nigeria where a 
passenger jet crashed.18 Thousands of onlookers converged on the scene, partially blocking 
access to the crash site, prompting the need for soldiers to clear the area. They used their 
fists and rubber whips, and even threw a wood plank at the crowd. Looking to evade the 
troops’ aggression, people took off in several directions, trampling others as they tried to 
avoid being crushed themselves.18
It is important to note that people who are informed of a danger will undertake any feasible 
actions they believe will reduce that danger. If authorities do not provide suggested actions, 
citizens will take action anyway, usually increasing the incidence of convergence.
Preventing convergence at major emergency incident sites will increase responders’ 
efficiency and provide a safer environment for all by reducing the number of people at the 
disaster scene. By establishing a staging area for family members, friends, and other 
onlookers, emergency officials can prevent uncoordinated and dysfunctional convergence at 
emergency sites. Early communication of an incident with clear, concise, and targeted 
messages will direct community members on appropriate actions to take during the response 
and recovery of an emergency event. An organized, coordinated plan for handling major 
emergency incident communication should be included in the country’s emergency 
operations plan.
Official communication at the onset of a major incident should provide clear recommended 
actions for the community. It is important to develop major incident plans that allow for 
appropriate integration of convergers into the response force and their management and 
care.19
Kenya’s emergency operations plan must outline how informal convergers will be dealt with, 
on the basic assumption that convergence is an inevitable phenomenon accompanying major 
emergency incidents. Control efforts must be aimed at channeling this behavior into 
adaptive, constructive forms. One useful principle for guiding convergence control policies 
is the diversion of convergence from disaster zones and nearby rescue and relief centers by 
providing a facility or area in non-affected regions where the communication facilities 
remain intact.1 This regulated approach can significantly reduce the vulnerability of 
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convergers and help ensure limited interference with rescue work. The positive aspect of this 
approach is that it can be used to incorporate donation stations for well-wishers who can 
contribute to the rescue without disrupting response. Success of designated convergence 
areas is reliant upon efficient and effective communications conveying the location and 
purpose of these areas to the general public.
The Nakuru town Pipeline spill provides an example of effective response where 
convergence did happen but was controlled by quickly cordoning off the area to prevent the 
crowd from coming close to the spilling petroleum fuel. The response was effective because 
it allotted the first responders space to effectively respond.
Convergers can be utilized as a resource, as they are frequently already at the scene or are 
among the first to arrive. They know about the incident and/or incident scene and can 
provide first responders with key information or manpower lacking upon initial arrival to the 
emergency. Observers of major emergency incidents are often the ones who initially call for 
emergency response assistance and can provide responders with verbal and visual 
information to help more effectively guide response to the incident. Onlookers can use short 
message service (SMS) and social media to communicate the scale of the disaster, give 
visual accounts of the emergency scene, and initiate response actions before emergency 
professionals have even arrived. Regardless of the size and location, disasters are always 
local, and the first people at the scene begin to assist before emergency personnel begin to 
arrive. It is thus the responsibility of the community to honestly and accurately communicate 
information in order to diminish rumors and subsequent convergence at the incident site.
Inaccuracies and ambiguities in initial reports from the emergency incident area are 
undoubtedly responsible for many of the serious convergence problems. Much of the initial 
anxiety-motivated convergence is stimulated by false or ambiguous announcements 
concerning the scope and extent of the disaster.1 It is therefore critical for information that is 
disseminated to not only be accurate but immediate, as inaccurate and delayed information 
serves as a catalyst for convergence. Development of a pre-disaster public education 
program focusing on the risks and dangers of convergence and recommended actions for the 
public in the event of a major emergency incident have also been shown to reduce the 
incidence of informal convergence.1 This creates public awareness, which can then be 
reinforced through cease-and-desist-type appeals broadcast over the radio, television, and 
social media sources, or published in online newspapers.
CONCLUSION
Analysis of publicly available media sources highlights the incidence of informal 
convergence at major emergency incident sites in Kenya. This behavior hampers rescue 
operations and poses a major threat to responders, convergers, victims of the incident, and 
the community at large. Some convergence is inevitable; however, through effective plans 
and timely distribution of accurate information, it can be contained and even used as a 
potential resource in assisting emergency incident victims. The key to controlling 
convergence is quality infrastructure provided through an Emergency Operations Center 
(EOC) that can effectively manage information and disaster data. Establishing a perimeter 
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for responders, creating a staging area for observers, and disseminating accurate information 
through a variety of media can minimize convergence and help utilize public manpower to 
assist in a response. Development of disaster plans that allow for appropriate integration of 
informal convergers into the response force while maintaining their safety and security can 
also help control this problem.
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